An American Civil War battle where a general was ordered to advance to a certain point and wait . . . so waiting was all he did?

Upvote:2

This could be Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson under the command of Sherman.

The American Battlefield Trust describes the battle as follows:

Johnston had entrenched his army on the long, high mountain of Rocky Face Ridge and eastward across Crow Valley. As Sherman approached, he decided to demonstrate against the position with two columns while he sent a third one through Snake Creek Gap, to the right, to hit the Western & Atlantic Railroad at Resaca, Georgia. The two columns engaged the enemy at Buzzard Roost (Mill Creek Gap) and at Dug Gap. In the meantime, the third column, under McPherson, passed through Snake Creek Gap and on May 9 advanced to the outskirts of Resaca, where it found Confederates entrenched. Fearing defeat, McPherson pulled his column back to Snake Creek Gap. On May 10, Sherman decided to take most of his men and join McPherson to take Resaca. The next morning, as he discovered Sherman's army withdrawing from their positions in front of Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston retired south towards Resaca.

Upvote:4

It reminds me of what I read about the Battle of Iuka. But it was Grant who "ordered Ord to move within 4 miles of the town, but to await the sound of fighting between Rosecrans and Price before engaging the Confederates." according to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Iuka (I haven't read sources beyond Wikipedia.) Ord could have attacked the Confederate right rear flank from where he stood. "A fresh north wind, blowing from Ord's position in the direction of Iuka, caused an acoustic shadow that prevented the sound of the guns from reaching him, and he and Grant knew nothing of the engagement until after it was over. Ord's troops stood idly while the fighting raged only a few miles away.[10]" with [10] = Woodworth, pp. 221–23; Eicher, pp. 372–74; Welcher, pp. 622–23 with

The battle was kind of a draw, as you wrote. It could have been a crushing defeat for the Confederates if Ord had shown more initiative.

Woodworth, Steven E.. Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861–1865. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. ISBN 0-375-41218-2.

Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5.

Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 1861–1865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 2, The Western Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. ISBN 0-253-36454-X.

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